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This paper presents an overview of recent issues surrounding Japan's official
development assistance (ODA) and recommends desirable directions for the future. The
importance of this topic cannot be overstated. Japan has been the world's largest provider
of ODA since 1991; its ODA in 2000, at US$13.1 billion, far exceeded that of the second
largest donor country, the United States, valued at $9.6 billion. However, recent
economic and political developments have already substantially altered (and will
continue to alter) the way Japanese ODA is administered. For example, for the first time
in history, the ODA budget for fiscal year (FY) 2001 was reduced from the previous
budget, by 3 percent for general account allocations and by 4 percent for overall
budgetary allocations. In the coming years, such changes will undoubtedly have a major
impact not only on Japan's intemational economic relations but also on the intemational
development community at large.
The issues involved are multidimensional. On the domestic front, the Japanese
economy continues to stagnate, with large fiscal deficits and mounting public debt. As a
result, the business community has been increasingly vocal in opposing the provision of
ODA, which has not benefited Japanese economic interests directly. The public has
called for greater accountability, and lamented the "faceless" tendency (lack of visibility)
of Japanese assistance. Many argue that Japan has not captured returns commensurate
with costs, even if ODA is considered merely a diplomatic tool. Provision to countries
with rising military expenditures and/or weapons of mass destruction has also provoked
public outrage. In particular, recently deteriorating relations with the People's Republic
of China have influenced ongoing public debates on ODA.
Despite Japan's generous contributions to multilateral institutions, many in the
intemational development community criticize Japan for heavy emphasis on bilateral
loans to economic infrastructure-related projects and for restrained willingness to
participate more openly in a multilateral framework. Experts generally agree that
effective development aid depends on the existence of sound policies and institutions and
that, owing to the fungibility of development aid, the return on a project is nothing but the
marginal return on the overall development program of the country concerned. Thus, a
reorientation of Japanese aid toward policy reformn  and institution building, within the
context of a broader cooperative framework, would benefit the developing world.
Japanese policymakers are aware of these criticisms but have made only a limited
(though by no means insignificant) effort in this direction. They are, however, under
domestic and intemational pressure to formulate a coherent ODA strategy subject to an
entirely new set of constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of
Japanese ODA in historical and comparative perspectives, Japan's motives for giving
development assistance, and the institutional setup. Section III summarizes the salient
features of Japanese ODA, including the high proportion of loans, the dominance of
untied aid, the large share of ODA going to Asia, the dominance of hard infrastructure,
and Japan's restrained willingness to participate in partnerships with other stakeholders.
Section IV discusses the nature of the emerging criticisms of Japanese ODA, the waning
public support for ODA, and the recent and prospective cuts in ODA budgets. Section V
Itakes up the thorny issues relating to the People's Republic of China. Finally, by way of
conclusion, Section VI summarizes several recommendations for the future of Japanese
ODA.
II.  JAPAN AS THE WORLD'S  LARGEST DONOR NATION
1. Comparative and Historical Perspectives on Japanese ODA
According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Japan has been the world's largest
provider of ODA since 1991 (Table 1). In 2000, for example, the volume of Japanese
ODA, at $13.1 billion, far exceeded that of any other major donor country, such as the
United States ($9.6 billion), Gernany  ($5.0 billion), the United Kingdom ($4.5 billion).
or France ($4.2 billion), although it was about a half the aggregate amount of all
European Union countries combined ($25.4 billion). Moreover, excluding contributions
and subscriptions to multilateral institutions and including both ODA and other official
flows (OOF), whose concessionality is generally lower than that of ODA, Japan has also
been the largest provider of bilateral official assistance to developing countries, giving
nearly $18.8 billion in 1999 (the latest year for which detailed breakdown is available).'
The total amount of Japan's bilateral official assistance (including OOF) exceeded even
the aggregate total of the EU countries combined, which stood at $17.0 billion.
Table 1. ODA Flows Provided by Major DAC Members in Selected Years
(Billion US dollars; percent of total in parentheses)
Japan  USA  European  Union  Total
Germ.  UK  France  Neth.  Denm.  Italy  Total  Bilaterals
1990  9.1  11.4  6.3  2.6  7.2  2.5  1.2  3.4  28.6  53.0
(17.2)  (21.5)  (11.9)  (4.9)  (13.6)  (4.7)  (2.3)  (6.4)  (54.0)  (100.0)
1995  14.5  7.4  7.5  3.2  8.4  3.2  1.6  1.6  31.7  58.9
(24.6)  (12.6)  (12.7)  (5.4)  (14.3)  (5.4)  (2.7)  (2.7)  (53.8)  (100.0)
1998  10.6  8.7  5.5  3.8  5.7  3.0  1.7  2.3  27.7  52.0
(20.4)  (16.8)  (10.6)  (7.3)  (11.0)  (5.8)  (3.3)  (4.4)  (53.3)  (100.0)
1999  15.3  9.1  5.5  3.4  5.6  3.1  1.7  1.8  26.8  56.4
(27.1)  (16.2)  (9.8)  (6.1)  (10.0)  (5.6)  (3.1)  (3.1)  (47.5)  (100.0)
2000  13.1  9.6  5.0  4.5  4.2  3.1  1.7  1.4  25.4  53.1
(24.6)  (18.1)  (9.5)  (8.4)  (8.0)  (5.8)  (3.2)  (2.6)  (47.9)  (100.0)
Note:  Net disbursements,  including  bilateral  ODA  and contributions  to multilateral  institutions.  Figures  for 1990
include  the debt  forgiveness  of non-ODA  claims,  except  in  total bilateral  figures.  Figures  for  2000  are provisional.
Source: OECD, DAC.
' See Appendix Table C. According to the convention adopted by the DAC, an official flow must be aimed
at promoting economic development and welfare in developing countries and be provided at concessional
financial terms (i.e., with a grant element of at least 25 percent) in order to qualify as ODA. Otherwise, the
official flow is classified as OOF. According to DAC practice, moreover, official flows that otherwise meet
the ODA requirements are not considered as ODA if they are directed to countries on Part II of the DAC
List of Aid Recipients (i.e., transition or high-income economies) or to multilateral institutions that
primarily benefit them. Such aid is called official aid (OA) and is not included in ODA in Table I or Table
2.
2Japan's development assistance program began on a modest scale in the mid-1950s,
in the form of reparations and quasi-reparations for the wartime damages Japan had
inflicted upon the Asian countries. Reparations were paid to four countries (Burma, the
Philippines, Indonesia and South Vietnam) over 1955-1965, for the amount of about $1
billion. Additional economic assistance was provided to other Asian countries that had
renounced their claims to formal reparations, including Thailand, Korea, Singapore and
Malaysia; as these funds were provided in the spirit of reparations, they were called
"quasi-reparations" in Japan (Takagi 1995). At the same time, Japan also initiated a
technical cooperation program as a participant in the Colombo Plan. 2
Table 2. Net Official Flows to Developing Countries, 1999
(Million US dollars)
ODA Flows  ODA and OOF Flows
Total  Asia  Africa  Americas  Total  Asia  Africa  Americas
Bilateral Flows
Japan  10,476  6,997  1,214  814  18,751  17,403  978  -657
United States  6,848  1,675  1,970  1,238  11,641  2,436  2,066  5,193
European Union  16,810  3,078  6,253  1,897  16,915  3,452  6,640  1,084
France  4,125  321  2,075  167  4,121  315  2,336  -98
Germany  3,278  1,072  1,063  398  3,238  1,421  1,082  37
United Kingdom  2,249  503  806  306  2,184  418  829  327
DAC Total  37,862  12,647  10,291  4,240  52,344  24,981  10,542  6,395
Multilateral  14,206  4,673  5,474  1,764  28,022  10,571  5,132  10,008
Development Banks
Note: ODA  includes  grants  and concessional  loans  only.  Bilateral  ODA  (or  OOF)  flows  in the table  exclude  donors'
contributions  to multilateral  institutions.  Excludes  Part 11  countries.
Source: OECD  DAC.
In the early 1960s, Japan gradually began to expand its development assistance
program, and became an important member of the international donor community. In
1960, it became one of the nine member countries of the Development Assistance Group,
which was reconstituted as the DAC within the OECD in the fall of 1961. In the same
year (1960), it joined the International Development Association (IDA), a World Bank
affiliate, and contributed $33.5 million to the total capital of $1 billion. Japan also played
the leading role in the establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966,
with the initial contribution of $200 million, equal to that of the United States.
Throughout the 1960s,  the volume of Japanese ODA increased steadily, rising from
about $100 million per year to about $500 million. By 1970, Japan had become the fifth
largest donor country, behind the United States, France, West Germany and the United
Kingdom. Japan surpassed the United Kingdom in 1972, West Germany in 1983, France
in 1986 and, temporarily, the United States in 1989. In the 1970s and 1980s, the US
dollar value of ODA increased by almost twenty-fold, from about $500 million to about
$9 billion. After Japan became the largest provider of ODA in 1991, the volume
continued to rise steadily in the 1990s. Over these periods, the net US dollar value of
OOF fluctuated up and down corresponding to the value of interest and amortization
2 The Colombo Plan was initially established by the British Commonwealth countries in 1950 as an
arrangement for facilitating technical and financial assistance to the member countries of South and
Southeast Asia. Japan became a member in late 1954.
3receipts; in gross terms, however, the value of OOF was almost as much as, if not more
than, the value of ODA on an annual basis.
2. Institutional Setup of ODA Administration-Multiple  Motives for Giving Aid
The large size of Japanese ODA (and OOF), supported by Japan's expanding
economy over the years, reflects the country's pursuit of both economic and political
interests. First, as a trading nation, it is in the interest of Japan to help promote the
economic development of its trading partners, particularly in neighboring Asia, and to
create and preserve a world of peace and stability, a necessary condition for stable trade
and investment. In the early years of its official assistance program, economics was
undoubtedly the overriding motive for giving aid. Japan used aid as a way to secure
sources of raw materials for its industry and to open markets for its exports (Takagi 1995).
Economic considerations continue to play an important part in policy making; the
preferences of the business community are voiced through the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI). 3
Box 1: Principles of Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter
Taking into account comprehensively each recipient country's request, its socioeconomic
conditions, and Japan's bilateral relations with the recipient country, Japan's ODA will be provided in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter (especially those of sovereign equality and
non-intervention in domestic matters), as well as the following four principles.
(1) Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem.
(2) Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be
avoided.
(3) Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries' military expenditures, their
development and production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, their export and import of arms,
etc., so as to maintain and strengthen international peace and stability, and from the viewpoint that
developing countries should place appropriate priorities in the allocation of their resources in their own
economic and social development.
(4) Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-
oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the
recipient country.
Note: Cabinet Decisions, June 30, 1992.  For a full text, see www.mofa.gojp/policy/oda.
Second, the constitutional limitation on military spending has not only allowed a
larger budgetary allocation on development assistance (relative to other countries), but
also increased its usefulness as a tool of international diplomacy. Over the years, as the
position of Japan as a major economic power was solidified, the Japanese government
has assumed an increasingly assertive attitude towards use of aid as a diplomatic tool.
3  As part of the major reorganization of the central government administration in January 2001, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry, with a slight change in its responsibilities. The MITI's influence over ODA loans was strong in
the past, when substantial part of disbursement was tied, because of the ministry's knowledge of finms
interested in procurements. As ODA loans became less tied and more open to foreign firms, however, its
influence began to wane.
4Reflecting the rising influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in ODA
decision making, in a cabinet decision of 1992, the Japanese government issued an "ODA
Charter," setting forth the principles of (1) concern for the environment, (2) avoidance of
military use of ODA, (3) attention to ODA recipients' military expenditure and
development of weapons of mass destruction, and (4) attention to the promotion of
democracy, market economy, and basic human rights (see Box 1).4
These economic and political motives in part correspond to what Hook and Zhang
(1998) have characterized, respectively, as the "METI discourse" (advocating the use of
aid to advance Japan's own economic interest) and the "MOFA discourse" (advocating
the use of aid to support Japan's international diplomacy and to pursue the internationally
accepted goal of improving the economic and social conditions of low-income nations). 5
MOFA's view more closely reflects those of United Nations (UN) agencies, since MOFA
maintains jurisdiction over contributions to the UN. 6 Between these two opposing
constituencies, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) enters the decision-making process from
the standpoint of fiscal authority (Hirata 1998) and as a self-appointed guardian of the
international financial system (Table 3). The MOF has generally concerned itself with
growth in the total volume of ODA and with limiting the level of exposure to any one
country, and has preferred loans to grants as a way of conserving fiscal resources. Using
aid to maintain an orderly international financial system-as  demonstrated during the
Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98-
may rightly be termed "the MOF discourse." 7 The MOF also has an institutional interest
in increasing appropriations and contributions to multilateral financial institutions, such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), over which it has
exclusive jurisdiction. What this implies is that the MOF oversees multilateral assistance
through the MDBs, while the MOFA, in principle, oversees bilateral development
assistance.
To outside observers, the fragmented decision-making apparatus has been a source
of controversy concerning the nature and motives of Japanese ODA. Arase (1993), for
example, has observed that the willingness to use aid for political purposes, particularly
the promotion of democracy and human rights, has been more rhetorical than real.
Likewise, Hook and Zhang (1998) have argued that, despite the "rhetorical alignment of
Japanese aid policy" with those of most other donors and international development
organizations (as championed by the "MOFA discourse"), economic and commercial
motives (as championed by the "METI discourse") remain dominant. Moreover,
4 Essentially the same principles had been announced in April 1991, in the so-called "four principles"
(Arase 1993; Takagi 1995).
5 In their original phraseology, the METI should be replaced by the MITI.
6 Prior to January 2001, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) was also part of this ODA policymaking
apparatus, as the supervisory agency of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). However, its
role was only nominal. It was given jurisdiction over the OECF in the first place because the other three
powerful ministries could not agree on which of them should be given jurisdiction. When the functions of
the EPA were merged into the Cabinet Office, its jurisdiction over ODA decision making was eliminated,
and the MOFA was given jurisdiction over the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)-see
footnote 12. The Cabinet Office has a say over ODA from the perspective of macroeconomic management.
No agency, however, has a coherent institutional apparatus to oversee Japan's ODA activity from an
integrated point of view.
7 We owe this view to Jiro Tominaga, who provided insightful comments on this issue.
5according to their view, while the METI and MOFA discourses continue to frame the
debate on Japanese ODA, the divergence  between the two had virtually disappeared b)
1998, as the Japanese government took a more explicit stance towards development
assistance as an instrument to promote its own economic revival (Hook and Zhang 1998).
Table 3. Japan's ODA Administration-Institutional  Setup
Ministries  (Bureaus)  in Charge  Objectives;  Agencies;  Jurisdiction
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)  . Promotion of Japan's international diplomacy.
Economic  Cooperation  Bureau  *  Improvements  of economic  and social conditions  in
poor nations.
. Implementing agencies: JICA (grants, TA); JBIC (ODA
loans).
. Jurisdiction over LTN  agencies.
Ministry of Finance (MOF)  . Preservation of fiscal soundness of ODA budget and
International  Bureau  country  exposures.
*  Securing a stable international financial system.
. Implementing agencies: JBIC (ODA loans, OOF).
. Jurisdiction over the IMF and MDBs.
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry  . Promotion of Japan's economic interest through
(METI)  expansion of trade and investment.
Trade  and Economic  Cooperation  Bureau  *  Assisting  the development  of environmental  industries.
l__  Implementing  agencies:  JICA (TA),  JBIC (OOF)
These views, however, do not seem to be consistent with the generally untied
nature of Japanese ODA (for details, see the next section). In fact, it was the MOFA that
vigorously promoted the untied aid policy to allow foreign firms to take part in bids for
Japanese ODA loan projects, despite strong opposition from the METI and the business
community (Hirata 1998). The MOFA has also been attempting to make greater use of
aid for improving the economic, social and political conditions of the poor nations,
including basic human rights, poverty alleviation, women in development, South-South
cooperation, and other issues of common interest to wider members of the intemational
development community. Katada (2000) has called these divided motives of Japanese aid
policy a "two-track aid approach" and argued that this "schizophrenia" reflects the reality
of the decision-making apparatus. Moreover, contrary to the views of Hook and Zhang
(1998), she argues that the two discourses have increasingly diverged in recent years. In
our view, however, what appears as "schizophrenia" is a mere reflection of the lack of
political leadership and, hence, of a national strategy on ODA, resulting in the expression
of uncoordinated views of different ministries with different aid motives. 8 In contrast,
8 The MOFA, MOF and METI discourses should not be taken literally as the ironclad positions of the
respective  government  ministries.  Rather,  they should  be viewed  collectively  as a convenient  way of
modeling the fundamentally conflicting views of ODA held within Japanese society, each broadly (but not
necessarily exclusively) aligned with the jurisdictional interests of the ministry concerned. Hence, what
Katada (2000) has called "schizophrenia" may not be a clear-cut institutional split. Through the process of
coordinated decision making across the MOFA, MOF and METI, a certain degree of consensus and
convergence of views has been achieved on specific issues. Moreover, government ministries do not
function in a vacuum but are subject to the influences of vested interests, public opinion and political
economy. When Hook and Zhang (1998) observed that the METI and MOFA discourses had converged by
1998 to take on a decisively more mercantilist orientation, they were in fact noticing the impact of the
business community's vested interest on the MOFA's attituide  towards tied aid, given its desire to maintain
business support for ODA.
6most other major donor countries have a more focused aid philosophy, in part possibly
reflecting the more centralized nature of aid administration. 9
3. The Budgetary Process of Japanese ODA
Japan's ODA budget is funded from (a) the general account of the central
government budget, (b) the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), and (c) interest
payments and repayments of principal on previous ODA loans as well as carryovers from
previous years, under the trust funds (special accounts) of the central government budget.
Two types of budgets, the ODA budget in the general account and the overall ODA
budget, are prepared every year (see, for example,  the fiscal 2001 budgets in Table 4).
The overall ODA budget is the sum of the ODA budget in the general account and other
sources. Typically, in gross terms, the overall budget is close to twice the size of the
general account budget. Though not shown in the table, Japan's OOF is financed mainly
by non-general account sources.
Table 4. Japan's ODA Budget, FY 2001 (Billion yen)
General Account  Other Sources  Overall Budget
Grants  740.3  179.2  919.5
Bilateral  606.6  23.9  630.5
Multilateral  133.7  155.3  289.0
Loans  306.3  660.5  966.8
Gross Total  1,046.6  839.7  1,886.3
Less repayment  --  374.8  374.8
Net Total  1,046.6  464.9  1,511.5
Source:  Government  of Japan.
Non-general account sources are funded through the FILP, which is an off-budget,
government-supervised  program of borrowing and lending. Most of the resources in the
FILP have come from postal savings deposits, postal insurance  premiums, and provident
pension fund contributions entrusted with the Trust Fund Bureau of the Ministry of
Finance, but some have also come from capital market funding. Almost all OOF
activities have been financed through borrowing from the Trust Fund Bureau and the
capital market. In April 2001, the FILP restructuring process began to separate the
lending activities from the statutory funding activities in order to bring greater market
discipline into the FILP.'0 As a result, postal savings deposits, postal insurance premiums,
9  For example, according to the United Kingdom's official position, its "development strategy is now
focused on the reduction of abject poverty in the world" and is committed  to focus all of its "development
efforts on the achievement of the International  Development Targets," as formulated by DAC members in
May 1996 (United  Kingdom, Departmnent  for International Development, White Paper on International
Development, 2000). The position of the United States, on the other hand, is somewhat more diffused, as it
attempts to accomplish  both foreign policy objectives and humanitarian goals. Even so, its aid philosophy
is focused on dealing with "the two most distinctive trends in the world since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
globalization and conflict" and its aid activities are carried out under three "pillars": economic growth and
agriculture, global health, and conflict prevention and development relief (Testimony of Andrew Natsios,
Administrator of USAID, before the Senate Appropriations  Committee, May 8, 2001).
10  Starting in April 2001, the Trust Fund Bureau began to issue FILP bonds to finance its FILP activities.
However, as a transitional measure to a more fully market-oriented  regime, the postal savings and
insurance,  as well as pension fund schemes, are required for seven years to channel the contributed funds to
the Trust Fund Bureau through purchases of these FILP bonds. The Trust Fund Bureau lends money to
7and provident pension fund contributions, which have served as an easy and plentiful
source of funds for ODA loans, may no longer be directly available for this purpose. The
non-general account sources may have to be raised in the market through issuing specific
bonds (such as JBIC bonds). In short, ODA will continue to be financed by a mixture of
the general account and borrowed funds, with the latter's funding sources possibly
shifting away from the Trust Fund Bureau to capital markets over time. OOF will have to
rely almost exclusively on capital market funding.  "  I
While a number of government ministries and agencies are involved in the
administration of ODA and other official assistance, in termns  of both influence and
volume, by far the most important are the MOFA, MOF and METI. Based on the
decisions of these government ministries, an overwhelming proportion of bilateral
assistance is administered by the MOFA and implemented by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).
The JICA is the main executing agency for grants and technical assistance. The JBIC is
the principal executing agency for ODA loans (concessional) as well as OOF loans
(commercial or nonconcessional).12
The average interest rate on yen-denominated ODA loans has been about 2 percent,
with ten years of grace period and thirty years of maturity.  1 3 As long as the market
interest rate remains low, ODA loans can be financed through borrowing from the Trust
Fund Bureau with limited government subsidies. If the market interest rate rises, however,
ODA loans will face a greater negative spread and require greater subsidies from the
general account. As the FILP restructuring process is completed (including the possible
privatization of the Postal Savings System in the long run), the government must make a
hard decision as to the extent of government subsidies provided to ODA loan activity, or
the allocation of fiscal resources between ODA and other activities, and between grants
and loans within the ODA resources.
As an additional point, it is worth noting that the ODA budgetary process is
fragmented among ministries and agencies. In essence, different ministries and agencies
prepare their own ODA budgets without coordinating among themselves, in terms of
development program priorities of recipient countries or global and regional
considerations. In other words, there is no overall strategic principle to govern the ODA
budgetary process, particularly regarding the allocation of resources between bilateral
and multilateral assistance, between loans and grants, and across countries and sectors.
JBIC for extending concessional (ODA loans) and nonconcessional loans (OOF). To finance the negative
interest  rate  spread  for  ODA  loans  that  need  to be provided  at a low  interest  rate,  JBIC  receives  interest
subsidy from the general account.
" Though bonds issued for OOF (i.e., JBIC bonds) are not government guaranteed, the market continues to
regard them as de facto government guaranteed because of the availability of budgetary support in case of
possible  financial  loss.
12 JBIC was created in October 1999  by merging the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (in charge of
ODA loans) and the Export-Import Bank of Japan (in charge of providing OOF including commercial
credits and other nonconcessional loans).
13  Reflecting the low interest rate policy of the Bank of Japan in recent years, the average interest rate on
yen-denominated nonconcessional loans (OOF) dropped to less than 2 percent in the late 1  990s and becamne
virtually the same as the terms of ODA loans.
8III.  SALIENT FEATURES OF JAPAN'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
ODA consists of bilateral grants (including grant aid and technical assistance),
loans and multilateral assistance (provided to multilateral institutions, such as the World
Bank, the ADB, and United Nations agencies). Japan's ODA has certain salient features
that reflect its institutional setup as well as the aid philosophy born out of its own
development experience.
1. A High Proportion of Loans
Japanese ODA has been characterized by a much larger share of loans (hence a
correspondingly smaller share of grants), relative to the DAC average. Of the total ODA
of $15.3 billion in 1999, for example, loans accounted for 32.2 percent, grants 36.0
percent (of which 20.8 percent was for technical assistance), and multilateral assistance
31.8 percent. In contrast, the proportion of grants typically exceeds 90 percent in other
DAC countries. Japan's share of around 40 percent over the years is the lowest among the
DAC countries. Partly as a result, the grant element of overall ODA (including both loans
and grants) is also the lowest. In this way, the more balanced mixture of loans and grants
that characterizes Japanese ODA resembles the operation of most multilateral
development banks (MDBs), where commercial and highly concessional operations exist
side by side, such as of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) and IDA in the World Bank Group.
The high proportion of loans in Japanese ODA has reflected the institutional setup
of the Japanese aid administration, in which funds borrowed from the FILP have
accounted for a large share. In effect, FILP funds have been used to finance ODA loans,
with the general account being used to finance their subsidy (or grant element) portion.
This setup has allowed a rapid expansion of ODA over the years without resorting to a
correspondingly large general account allocation, although the recent restructuring of the
FILP may in the future place a limit on the quantitative expansion of borrowed resources
for ODA loans. The high proportion of loans in Japan's ODA has reflected the
government's desire to leverage ODA resources; if one dollar is spent as a subsidy to
finance the negative interest spread, it can generate a much larger volume of loans.
Meanwhile, a one dollar grant increases ODA by only a dollar. On a more substantive
level, the heavy reliance on loans also reflects the Japanese aid philosophy, with
emphasis on the role of self-help. The recipients can develop their economies more
effectively when they are faced with the requirement to repay, as they are forced to
allocate scarce resources more efficiently for economic development. As the recipient
economies grow, greater fiscal revenues will allow the repayment of the loans.
As an unintended consequence of the high loan content of Japanese ODA, some
recipient countries have suffered in recent years from debt management difficulties
arising from the secular appreciation as well as the large fluctuations of the Japanese yen
(in which Japanese ODA loans are denominated) against the US dollar and other
currencies. At least from the perspective of the recipient's debt management, the yen has
not been a desirable currency of denomination. For this reason, some have called on the
9Japanese government to denominate its ODA loans in the recipient's own currency or to
allow the recipient to choose the currency of debt denomination (as the World Bank has
done in some cases). It should be noted, however, that currency risk can be hedged
effectively through swap and other arrangements, albeit at a cost. Yen-denominated debt
can also be better managed by a prudent exchange rate and reserve policy, directed at
reducing the negative impact of yen rate fluctuations. 
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2. Dominance  of Untied  Aid
The other side of the high loan share (and the correspondingly low grant share) is
that Japanese ODA is generally untied to the purchases of goods or services from
domestic suppliers. According to the international norm, loans should not be tied, but
grants can be, so that donor country firms benefit outright only from free money. In 1980,
only 25.8 percent of Japanese ODA was untied, one of the lowest among the DAC
members. As a result of the MOFA's conscious effort, the share of untied aid rose rapidly
in the 1980s, and became the highest among the top donors. In 1999, 96.4 percent of
Japan's total bilateral ODA commitments was untied (an additional 2.9 percent was
partially untied), whereas the untied ratio was 84.7 percent for Germany and 91.8 percent
for the United Kingdom (Table 5). The EU average was 81.2 percent. It is believed that
the figure for the United States is much lower, close to zero.
Table  5. Share  of Untied  Bilateral  Assistance  (Percentage)
1980  1985  1990  1995  1998  1999
Japan  25.8  60.8  77.0  96.3  93.6  96.4
United  States  (a)  26.8  40.9  69.5  27.3  NA  NA
European  Union  54.7  47.4  43.5  64.1  72.9  81.2
France  43.3  42.5  47.1  58.4  66.8  NA
Germany  82.2  63.7  43.6  60.3  86.5  84.7
United  Kingdom  25.2  27.6  NA  86.2  79.6  91.8
DAC  Total  44.1  47.3  59.4  69.6  81.4  87.8
Note: (a) The latest figure for the United States is not available, but it is believed to be virtually zero.
Source: OECD, DAC.
The large volume of Japanese ODA loans has created a large "untied market" for
non-Japanese firms. In fact, the share of Japanese firms in the procurements of ODA-
related contracts has been declining in recent years, in part reflecting their increasingly
higher cost structure. Fujisaki et al. (1996-97), for example, report that the share of
contracts given to Japanese firms in ODA loan projects declined from nearly 70 percent
in the 1980s to 27 percent in 1994. Table 6 shows that the share declined to a mere 19
percent in 1999 (and 24 percent in 2000) while fluctuating in the rest of the 1  990s.  '5 As a
result of this low and declining share of Japanese firms in ODA loan procurements, many
in the Japanese business community have come to perceive that ODA does not serve the
economic interests of Japan. This perception has weakened the business community's
14 This can be done through,  for example,  the adoption  of a currency  basket  system  (by stabilizing  the
exchange  rate against  a basket  of currencies  where the weight  of the yen is reasonably  large)  and holding  a
more  balanced  portfolio  of foreign  exchange  reserves  (by increasing  the yen's  share).
'5  According  to the Overseas  Construction  Association  of Japan,  Japanese  firms currently  account  for only
about  15 percent  of ODA-related  construction  contracts.
10support for ODA in recent years, particularly as the Japanese economy has stagnated and
the construction industry has been among the hardest hit. Consequently, national policy
towards ODA must be reformulated so as to clarify its role and benefits for the Japanese
public at large (particularly the taxpayers).
Table 6. Share of Japanese ODA Loan Procurements by Nationality (Percentage)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Japan  27.0  31.3  35.4  29.4  27.4  27.3  33.3  27.9  20.5  19.3  23.5
Other Developed  Countries  21.2  20.8  12.9  17.6  15.4  12.9  13.5  11.6  16.4  9.3  8.7
Developing  Countries  38.0  38.6  40.5  35.2  34.7  34.2  25.5  28.9  35.8  38.0  35.9
Local  Counterpart  Costs  13.8  9.2  11.3  17.8  22.4  25.7  27.8  31.5  27.2  33.4  31.9
Note: Data include commodity loans. The share of procurements by developing countries is for yen-denominated ODA
loans.
Source: Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
3. A Large Share of ODA to Asia
Another feature of Japanese ODA is that a high proportion of total ODA goes to
Asia. Although Asia's share has declined from the range of 90 percent in the early 1970s,
it remains high and has increased markedly in recent years following the East Asian
currency crisis.16  In 1999, for example, Asia accounted for $7 billion out of the $10
billion total provided in bilateral assistance (Table 2). Asia's share is even greater when
total official flows (including both ODA and OOF) are considered, since the relatively
developed Asian economies are less eligible for outright grants. In 1999, for example,
Asia accounted for $17 billion out of the $19 billion total provided in bilateral ODA and
OOF. The five largest cumulative recipients of Japanese ODA are Indonesia, China, the
Philippines, Thailand and India.
Table 7. Total ODA to Five Largest Recipients by Donor Country 1990 and 1999
(in terms of annual net flows)
1990  1999
Japan  Indonesia, China, Philippines, Thailand,  Indonesia, China, Thailand, Vietnam, India
Bangladesh
United  States  Egypt, Israel, Philippines, El Salvador,  Egypt, Bosnia Herzegovina, Indonesia,
Honduras  Colombia, Jordan
European  Union  China, Egypt, India, Tanzania, Mozambique  China, Egypt, Tanzania, Bosnia Herzegovina,
Mozambique
France  Cote d'Ivoire, New Caledonia, French  French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Egypt,
Polynesia, Senegal, Morocco,  Senegal, Morocco
Germany  Egypt, Turkey, China, Jordan, India  China, FYR-Serbia, Egypt, Pakistan, Tanzania
United  Kingdom  Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Malawi  India, Bangladesh, Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania
Multilaterals  Bangladesh, India, China, Pakistan, Kenya  India, Bangladesh, China, Honduras, Vietnam
Note: Includes grants and concessional loans only. If OA (aid to Part II countries) were included the five largest recipients
would include Israel (in 1999 for the United States), Poland, and some countries of the former Soviet Union.
Source: OECD, DAC
16 Following  the East  Asian crisis,  Japan announced  assistance  measures  totaling  about $44  billion
(including  financing  on commercial  terms)  through  the end of November  1998. This was followed  by the
New Miyazawa  Initiative,  announced  in October  1998, whereby  Japan  agreed to extend  concessional  and
non-concessional  assistance  totaling  $30 billion  to the crisis-affected  East Asian  countries.
11Geographical distribution of official assistance usually reflects special historical or
political relations between donors and recipients. Therefore, the high share of Asia
should not be surprising for Japanese ODA, reflecting its genesis as war reparations and
quasi-reparations to Asian countries. European countries, on the other hand, provide a
comparatively larger share of ODA to Africa (Table 7). On a deeper level, however, the
large share of Asia also corresponds to the large share of loans in Japanese official flows,
because loans tend to be provided to middle-income developing countries.
4. Request-Based Assistance
According to the tenet of "self-help" established over the years, the request for
assistance must, in principle, come from the recipient country, after it has formulated and
prioritized its own development program. This principle embodies the idea that Japan
will help only those countries that are willing to help themselves. The principle of self-
help has also been invoked to justify the high proportion of loans in Japanese ODA.
Requiring recipients to design their own projects or programs has, in the past,
limited access to Japanese ODA, given that human resources and institutional capacity
remain a constraint in many developing countries. The process has also created room for
the private sector to enter the planning phase and to propose desired projects or programs.
Consequently, some companies-particularly  Japanese consulting/construction firms-
have pursued profit for themselves by proposinV  projects to recipient governments that
benefit the companies rather than the countries.  As a result, the number of "request-
based" projects has expanded, and the Japanese aid authorities and agencies have
responded by increasing loans. However, projects thus proposed often are inconsistent
with the national development program of the recipient country and, hence, may be
unproductive and contribute little to economic development. Partly to address such
unintended consequences, Japanese policymakers have made exceptions to applying the
"request-based assistance" principle in recent years, most notably in the JICA's so-called
"country-specific approaches."
5. Dominance of Hard Infrastructure Assistance
In applying the "request-based assistance" principle, the Japanese government has
tended to stress the economic rather than the social needs of recipients. Coupled with the
preference of many developing countries for big visible projects-often  dubbed "white
elephants"-this  helps explain the large share of Japanese aid earmarked for construction
of physical infrastructure, such as seaports, airports, roads, railroads, subways, power
plants, and communication facilities. In 1999, the share of economic infrastructure in
Japan's bilateral ODA was 32 percent, compared with 13 percent for the United States
and 12 percent for the United Kingdom (Table 8). Given the lack of adequate human
resources to implement assistance in soft areas, large-scale physical projects-funded
predominantly by loans-have  been favored by the Japanese bureaucracies as a means of
disbursing ODA quickly (Fujisaki et al. 1996-97).
17  It is often claimed that easy availability of ODA resources for Japanese consulting/construction firms has
adversely impacted their efficiency, productivity and international competitiveness.
12Table 8. Distribution of Bilateral ODA by Sector for Selected Countries, 1999
(Percentage of total bilateral commitments)
Social  & Adm.  Economic  Production  Multi-  Programme
Infrastructure Infrastructure Agriculture  Industry  sector  Assistance
Japan  18.9  31.5  7.6  5.7  4.8  11.2
United States  31.3  12.9  2.3  0.1  9.9  9.9
European Union  36.8  6.4  4.7  0.9  7.2  2.4
France  39.2  9.0  5.7  0.9  7.6  2.2
Germany  34.7  25.8  3.9  0.7  9.9  2.4
United Kingdom  29.2  12.2  9.4  4.1  2.9  8.7
DAC Total  29.9  17.2  5.5  2.2  7.4  6.9
Source: OECD, DAC
Correspondingly, the share of social development, such as the environment,
poverty reduction, education, health and nutrition, has been limited in Japanese bilateral
ODA. In 1999, the share of social infrastructure was 19 percent, compared with 31
percent for the United States and 37 percent for the European Union. Given the
increasingly important role private capital is expected to play in financing hard
infrastructure, particularly in middle-income developing countries, this feature of
Japanese ODA will not be sustainable. Japan will then face the challenge of having to
shift its emphasis from hard infrastructure towards soft infrastructure (such as education,
health and basic medical care) and policy reform-related assistance.
6. Dominance of Government-Led ODA
In terms of both design and execution, Japanese ODA is weak in the participatory
approach, being typically administered by governments and other official agencies. The
involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and of civil society in general is
limited. To be sure, grass-root participation by NGOs has begun and the Japanese
government has announced a more accommodating policy towards the involvement of
NGOs (see Tominaga and Sera 2000 for details),'8 but the size remains small in
comparison with the situation in other major donor countries.
According to DAC data for 1997, the share of NGO-participated grants was only 2
percent of total ODA in Japan, while the share was much higher in other major DAC
countries, such as the United States (37 percent), Germany (16 percent) and the United
Kingdom (9 percent). Reflecting the large absolute size of Japanese ODA, however, the
value of NGO-participated grants in Japan ($223 million) was the fourth largest.
The alleged lack of visibility of Japanese ODA may stem from the fact that ODA
activities are carried out mainly by governments, and contracted to large consulting firms,
with little grassroots participation by Japanese NGOs and individuals, or by members of
local civil society in the recipient countries.
'8 The  Cabinet  decision  of  August  1999,  "The  Medium-Term  Policy  on  Official  Development  Assistance,"
recognized  a "growing  demand  for  finely  tuned  assistance  that  directly  reaches  local  populations"  and  a
"growing  need  for  collaboration  with  NGOs  in the  implementation  of ODA  projects"  (as  quoted  in
Tominaga and Sera 2000).
137. Preference for a Bilateral Approach-Hesitation  Regarding Partnerships
While many DAC donor countries emphasize  the importance of working as
partners, Japan has shown a preference for working only with the governments of the
recipient countries. To be sure, there is no denying that Japan has been a generous
provider of resources to multilateral financial institutions-the  share of contributions to
multilateral institutions (of total ODA) was 32 percent in 1999, in contrast to 25 percent
for the United States and 37 percent for the European Union-and,  to that extent, Japan
has shown a willingness to work with the international development community at large.
Japan has also worked frequently with the MDBs in cofinancing and other partnership
arrangements, in part to benefit from the MDBs' technical expertise.
When working with the MDBs in cofinancing  arrangements, however, Japan has
taken pains to preserve its separate identity. In part, this preference for a bilateral
approach may reflect the large size of Japanese ODA, which allows the Japanese
government to enjoy certain economies of scale and leverage. In contrast, smaller donor
countries (particularly northern European donors) can only benefit from economies of
scale by entering into partnerships with each other and with the MDBs. At a deeper level,
however, Japan's dual position as a generous multilateral provider and a hesitant bilateral
partner reflects the fact that its policies towards multilateral assistance (administered
mainly by the MOF) and bilateral assistance (administered mainly by the MOFA) are not
well coordinated. As a result, the aid implementation agencies (JICA and JBIC) are often
unsure as to how to interact with the MDBs (the World Bank in particular) in country
programs.
Even so, the thinking of the international development community is changing in
this regard, led by the World Bank's move towards what it calls a Comprehensive
Development Framework (CDF).1 9 In response, Japan has made some efforts to work
with other stakeholders, particularly in some African countries where it lacks the depth of
knowledge, expertise and experience it enjoys in Asia, with the common objective of
promoting economic development and poverty reduction in the recipient countries. Japan,
however, seems to distance itself from attempts of European DAC donors to create a
"common fund" from the pooled resources. For the most part, when it comes to the use of
bilateral resources, Japan still prefers to work alone, fearing that its already low visibilitv
will become even more diminished if its resources are to be pooled with other donors'
resources and used for common objectives.
IV. EMERGING  CRITICISMS  OF JAPANESE ODA
The Japanese government regards official assistance (ODA and OOF) as an
important diplomatic instrument to ensure national security by promoting economic
19 The World Bank has proposed a comprehensive approach to assist sustainable economic development
through structural, human and physical factors (see Wolfensohn 1999). This approach emphasizes program
comprehensiveness, the recipient country's ownership of the program, and partnership among stakeholders
(the country's government, international organizations, donor countries, civil society and the private
sector).
14development and political stability in the developing world. However, the stagnation of
the Japanese economy, with rising fiscal deficits and debt, has made it increasingly
difficult in recent years to generate the same level of public support for ODA as in the
past. To be sure, in absolute terms, public support for ODA remains high, relative to
other major donor countries. Even so, according to a recent opinion poll, those who
favored "more ODA" declined from 41 percent in 1991 to 28 percent in 1998; those who
favored "less ODA" rose from 8 percent to 19 percent over the same period (Katada
2000). Certainly, there is declining support for the large size of ODA that Japan has
provided to developing countries.
Within Japan, some of the criticisms of the current administration of ODA
include20:
*  It lacks a coherent national strategy.
*  It lacks transparency and efficiency.
*  It fails to strictly follow the principles embodied in the ODA Charter of 1992,
in particular, that ODA should not go to countries, such as China, with large
military spending and weapons of mass destruction.
*  It is biased towards hard infrastructure and places insufficient emphasis on soft
infrastructure and social sector development.
*  It is not participatory and does not promote partnership with other stakeholders
in the international development community, including other bilateral donors
and civil society.
*  It is "faceless" and does not benefit Japan or its taxpayers commercially,
diplomatically or otherwise.
As a result of these and other criticisms, and given the current economic realities, a
budget cut has been proposed for ODA since FY1998.  However, the outbreak of the East
Asian Crisis postponed the cut's implementation.21  The government finally made the
decision and curtailed the ODA budget for the first time in FY2001 (covering April 2001-
March 2002) by 3 percent for the general account and 4 percent for the overall allocation.
The cut is almost entirely accounted for by a reduction in the MOF allocation for the
MDBs and ODA loans (for the general account), and more than accounted for by a 7
percent reduction in ODA loans (for the overall budget). It is expected that the tight
budgetary stance will continue, especially in the provision of concessional loans. It
should be noted, however, that Japan is not the only country that has cut its ODA budget
in recent years. In fact, budgetary support for ODA has been declining in many donor
countries, including the United States.
Looking beyond the domestic scene, from the standpoint of the international
development community, Japan will need to improve the effectiveness of ODA. A recent
World Bank report on aid effectiveness concludes that recipient countries must reform
economic policies and institutions in order to achieve growth and poverty reduction
through aid flows (World Bank 1998). Data support the view that countries with strong
20 These criticisms are compiled from various Japanese newspaper articles on Japanese ODA.
21 All of the increase in ODA in 1998 and 1999  was allocated  to the crisis-affected  East  Asian  countries.
15economic  policies (defined as low inflation, fiscal balance or surplus, and trade openness)
and high-quality institutions (defined as rule of law, effective public bureaucracy, and
minimal incidence of corruption) benefit the most from aid by achieving the highest
growth rates.22  Moreover, "ideas" are shown to be more effective than "aid flows" in
generating reform and in improving the quality of public services. The report concludes
that "well-designed assistance can help countries find the policies that they need, and
help communities improve important public services that make for a better life today and
contribute to long-term development."
Given the large size of ODA it provides, and given the lack of any other effective
diplomatic tool, it is understandable  that Japan prefers a bilateral approach to aid as a
means of enhancing visibility and political leverage. Given its own development
experience, and given its particular institutional setup for aid administration, it is also
uinderstandable  that Japan emphasizes loans to finance economic infrastructure. However,
by now it is clear that development involves a multi-dimensional transformation of
society; to the extent that funds are fungible, "the net benefit from financing any
individual project is...  .the net benefit of the marginal government program" (Stiglitz
1999). What determines the success or failure of development assistance is not the choice
of a particular project, but the whole set of policies and institutions adopted by the
recipient country, including its own governance structure.
In short, Japan needs to adopt a strategic approach to assisting economic
development and poverty reduction in low-income countries, in greater coordination with
other stakeholders in the international development community. For aid to be effective,
institution building and economic reform need to be emphasized, even for hard
infrastructure projects. Providing "ideas" can be more important than providing a large
amount of financial resources. Indeed, Japan must be more involved in providing "ideas"
for institution building and policy reform in the recipient countries, based on its own
historical experiences. This is the only realistic way to improve the "effectiveness" and
"quality" of development assistance, particularly at a time when the volume of aid is
expected to decline. 23
To improve the "effectiveness" and "quality" of ODA, the Japanese policymakers
must explicitly define Japan's aid goals and make ODA activity more transparent and
accountable to taxpayers. First, clear objectives must be defined, such as: "to assist
sustainable economic development of low-income countries, focusing on poverty
reduction and environmental improvement, and thereby contributing to stability, peace
and prosperity in the international community." This objective emphasizes the need to
provide "international public goods" through ODA. Second, the aid authorities and
implementation agencies must support effective, comprehensive development programs
in recipient countries, and partnerships with the international development community.
22 From the standpoint of the recipients and the international community, the effectiveness of aid can only
be measured in terms of its ability to achieve the ultimate objectives of growth and poverty reduction.
However, we also recognize that, as a sovereign nation with its own national interests, Japan can
legitimately have additional objectives for ODA.
23 In discussions of ODA, "quality" is sometimes used as a synonym for "concessionality." Here, however,
"quality" refers more generally to the degree to which aid contributes to the ultimate objectives of sustained
economic development, as measured, for example, by the outcome to cost ratio.
16Third, to improve transparency and accountability  to taxpayers, the post-project
evaluation system needs to be strengthened and be made credible.
The Japanese policymakers are well aware of these criticisms and issues. In June
1998, for example, the "Council on ODA Reforms for the 21st Century," a government
advisory body, presented to the Foreign Minister a report emphasizing the need to (a)
formulate country assistance programs, (b) emphasize poverty alleviation and social
development with a focus on people-oriented development, (c) increase assistance for
human resources development, (d) give broader intellectual support, and (e) form global
partnerships and cooperation with other countries, multilateral institutions and private
sectors, among others (MOFA 1999). Implementing these new initiatives would, in turn,
require Japan to build its own capacity to think strategically about the sector-wide and
economy-wide impacts of its projects in the recipient countries.
V. THE CHINA CHALLENGE
Following the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in
1978, Japan became the first non-socialist country to provide concessional assistance to
the People's Republic of China (hereafter, simply China). In May 1979, the Japanese
government decided to provide a loan of Y420  billion to help jointly extract natural
resources and energies (Zhao 1993). In August 1979, the Chinese government followed
by approaching the Japanese government with a request for a loan to finance major
infrastructure projects. Over the years 1979-99,  Japan extended Y2.7  trillion of ODA and
Y3.4  trillion of untied loans (OOF) to China, making China the second largest recipient of
Japan's development assistance after Indonesia.
Table 9. Net Flows of ODA to China in Selected Recent Years
(Millions of US dollars; percent of grand total in parentheses)
1990  1995  1998  1999
Japan  723.0  1,380.2  1,158.2  1,226.0
(34.6)  (39.6)  (48.8)  (52.5)
United  States  0.4  38.3
--  --  (0.0)  (1.6)
European  Union  674.2  1,020.1  478.0  477.1
(32.2)  (29.2)  (20.1)  (20.4)
France  88.0  91.2  29.8  46.2
(4.2)  (2.6)  (1.3)  (2.0)
Germany  228.9  684.1  321.3  304.6
(10.9)  (19.6)  (13.6)  (13.1)
United  Kingdom  33.3  47.8  55.4  59.3
(1.6)  (1.4)  (0.2)  (2.5)
Total  Bilaterals  1511.7  2,531.3  1,731.7  1,821.6
(72.4)  (72.5)  (73.0)  (78.1)
Total  Multilaterals  577.4  958.0  639.5  512.2
(27.6)  (27.5)  (27.0)  (21.9)
Grand  Total  2,089.1  3,489.3  2,371.2  2,333.8
(100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)
Note: ODA includes grants and concessional loans only.
Source: OECD DAC.
17By far, Japan is the largest bilateral donor of ODA and the second largest provider
of official assistance to China after the World Bank. In recent years, Japan has provided
ODA exceeding $1 billion on an annual basis, well over half of the total bilateral
assistance that China has received (Table 9). By contrast, the share of the United States-
legally prohibited in principle from providing concessional assistance to a communist
regime-has  been miniscule. These large financial flows from Japan to China reflect not
only China's large economic size, but also the nature of assistance as, at least initially,
quasi-reparation for wartime damage-notwithstanding  that China had formally
renounced all war-related claims against Japan. 24
However, as China has developed and modernized over the last twenty years and
become a major military power, many Japanese have begun to wonder if current levels of
ODA (and OOF) are too high. Public perceptions of Sino-Japanese relations have also
influenced the debate. Given the pacifist principles embodied in the ODA Charter of
1992 (see Box 1), public outcry over the 1995 Chinese nuclear tests led the Japanese
government to suspend grants (except for humanitarian aid) to China. The suspension
continued until March 1997,  when China signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (Katada 2001).
The climate for Japanese development assistance to China has since remained
tenuous at best (Deng 1997). To make matters worse, Japanese public opinion towards
China deteriorated rapidly in 1998, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin, on his first
official visit to Japan, repeated that Japan should officially apologize in writing for the
1937 invasion of China (Johnstone 1998). In addition, certain recent developments and
public perceptions have helped magnify the public's misgivings about the continued
provision of ODA to China:
*  China's military spending has been rising continuously over the last 12 years,
reaching the level of about 13 percent of its national budget. In effect, Japanese
taxpayers' money is being used as low-cost, fungible funds to construct
highways, railroads, airports and other facilities that are critical for military
mobilization.
*  China, while receiving a large sum of official financial assistance from Japan, is
providing a relatively large amount of economic assistance of its own to other
developing countries for strategic objectives, including the debt cancellation of
10 billion yuan (X130  billion) granted to African countries. 25
*  Several ODA-financed projects, such as airports, railroads, and highways, have
been-or  are being-privatized,  without consulting or notifying the Japanese
government. Privatization is contrary to Japan's long-established policy
24 Japan's official  position,  however,  remains  that the provision  of ODA  is unrelated  to China's
renouncement of all war-related claims.
25 In 1999 and 2000, for example, China provided (or decided to provide) economic assistance in the form
of loans and grants to Bangladesh, Botswana, Cambodia, Cote D'Ivoire, East Timor, Ghana, Kenya, Laos,
Mongolia, Nicaragua, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe
(Sankei Shimbun, December 5, 2000).
18regarding ODA, which should only be used to finance those projects that cannot
be financed by private sources.
*  While the Chinese government regards Japan's ODA as essential, the Chinese
public does not seem to be aware of the size or significance of that assistance,
and thus has  little appreciation of Japan's contributions.
Reflecting these concerns, the Japanese government is taking the view that China
should increasingly rely on domestic savings and foreign private capital to build hard
infrastructure, and that the domestic intra-governmental  fiscal transfer system should be
strengthened to address poverty reduction, particularly in the Western Provinces. The
Japanese government seems to believe that Japan's concessional and nonconcessional
assistance in financing the construction of economic infrastructure in the coastal areas has
played out its historically important role of promoting China's economic development
and modernization. At the same time, the Japanese government appears to view ODA as
useful leverage in encouraging China's transition towards a market economy and its
integration with the world economy. The Japanese government may also use public pleas
for a review of ODA policy to expedite a political settlement with China over
longstanding diplomatic issues, such as the demand for a written apology.
For Japan, China is too big to be ignored, and Japan's economic future depends on
deepening its economic interdependence with emerging East Asia, including China (in
addition to the ASEAN countries). Japan cannot afford to mismanage the political
relationship with China, given China's impending accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the resulting expansion of its markets and trade with the rest of
the world. Business leaders would certainly demand maintenance of ODA to China to
support their economic activities, emphasizing the continued need for physical
infrastructure in the coastal area.
Even so, the nature of ODA to China will change. In this context, a government
advisory body (MOFA 1  999a) recently recommended that future emphasis should be
placed on (a) environmental protection (containing air pollution and acid rain and
preserving clean water), (b) economic and social developments in the Western Provinces
including poverty reduction, education and health, (c) human resources development and
capacity building, and (d) promotion of mutual understanding. Moreover, Tokyo would
like to see Beijing (a) intensify public relations activity within China to encourage
awareness of-Japanese ODA, and (b) promote transparency and accountability of the
Chinese government and military.
The two countries still perceive Japanese assistance in very different ways. The
Chinese tendency is to see the ODA as atonement for Japan's wartime aggression-this
view is perhaps strengthened by Tokyo's reluctance to issue an official written apology. 26
The Japanese opinion, on the other hand, is that Japan has already sufficiently paid for
past behavior; any further economic assistance has nothing to do with war-related
compensation. In this view, China's exertion of "moral pressure" should cease.
26 This is particularly so, given that the Japanese government issued an official written apology for South
Korea in December 1998.
19In order to establish a mature bilateral relationship, the two countries must close
this perception gap. This is entirely possible if both sides take bold and forward-looking
political gestures.
VI. CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVES-THE  FUTURE OF JAPANESE ODA
Japan's ODA is at a crossroads. The challenges to the current mode of ODA
administration come from both domestic and international quarters. Domestically, given
the large fiscal deficits and mounting public debt, the Japanese government no longer
enjoys public support to maintain the current level of ODA, which has made Japan by far
the world's largest donor country during the past decade. A small cut has already been
made in the fiscal 2001 ODA budget, and a further cut may be forthcoming. Given the
stagnant economy and the largely untied status of Japanese ODA, the business
community has increasingly urged that ODA should more explicitly serve Japan's own
economic interests. The public is critical of the low visibility of Japanese contributions
(as being "faceless"), making it ever more challenging to muster support for contributions
to multilateral financial institutions, for which the MOF is the only domestic constituency.
The public is also alarmed by violation of the 1992 ODA Charter, and is demanding
greater accountability and transparency in ODA administration. The recent restructuring
of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), which terminated the direct use of
postal savings deposits, postal insurance and provident pension fund premiums for ODA
purposes, may further squeeze the future growth of ODA loans.
Internationally, notwithstanding recognition of Japan's generous contributions to
multilateral institutions, many criticize Japan's tendency to lend for infrastructure-related
projects and its hesitation to participate more openly within a multilateral framework.
Given the fungibility of development assistance, the international development
community has increasingly accepted the idea that aid effectiveness depends on the
quality of a country's overall development program and on the existence of strong
policies and institutions that promote economic growth and poverty reduction. In light of
these views, Japan will need to work more closely with the wider developmental
community, including other donors and civil society, in order to maximize the impact of
its ODA. Japanese policymakers have expressed an intention to move in this direction.
For example, to generate public support for ODA (if for no other reason), they have
announced greater accommodation of NGO involvement. However, the Japanese
government can progress only so far without a substantial political and bureaucratic
reorientation of its aid administration apparatus.
The single most pressing issue facing Japanese ODA at present concerns policy
towards China. China's emergence as an economic competitor and potential military
threat has eroded Japanese public support for current ODA levels. Given the principles of
the ODA Charter, the public has protested continued assistance to a country with rising
military expenditures and weapons of mass destruction. A general souring of Sino-
Japanese relations-caused  partly by Beijing's repeated demands that Tokyo issue a
written apology for the 1937 invasion-has  complicated the situation. As a result,
Japanese ODA to China is likely to shift, as it should, toward social development,
20particularly in the Western Provinces, leaving the bulk of traditional economic projects to
the private sector.
To meet these domestic and international  challenges, Japan must develop a
coherent national strategy for ODA. The strategy must focus on poverty reduction and
environmental improvement, thereby helping to prevent conflict and instability and
assisting sustained economic development in the developing world. In the past, such a
focus has been hampered by the fragmentation or "schizophrenia" of aid administration,
characterized by competition and bargaining among ministries and agencies with
different vested interests. A coherent ODA strategy is possible only through reconciling
these various demands and pressures. Currently, aid is being pressed to serve a variety of
different ends, including international diplomacy (MOFA), support of domestic
constituencies (METI), a stable international financial system (MOF), and convergence
with international norms. At the same time, in an environment of economic stagnation
and waning public support, MOF hopes to trim ODA budgets. Strong leadership from the
Prime Minister is necessary to consolidate the aid administration, perhaps by creating a
single development aid agency.
To make ODA more efficient, transparent, and accountable to taxpayers will be no
easy task. Meeting these goals will require an effective post-project evaluation system
that can operate within the context of a recipient country's overall development strategy.
Japan must also respond to pressures to shift ODA away from hard infrastructure and to
improve aid quality through collaboration with the wider developmental community,
including other donors and civil society. Japan should encourage grassroots participation
and NGO involvement to help identify, establish and implement small-scale, community-
based projects that truly benefit local communities. In our view, such a participatory
approach would not only enhance ODA's effectiveness,  but would also-paradoxically-
increase the visibility of Japan's "face." There is no better way to make Japan's ODA
more perceptible than having its citizens work side by side with local people and
institutions (see Box 2).
Box 2: Making ODA More Visible through Grassroots Participation
The following scheme may be considered to encourage wider participation by Japanese civil
society in ODA activity.
First, the Japanese government grants YI-3 million to a group with promising ideas to improve
social conditions and alleviate poverty in low-income developing countries. The group-an  NGO or
any group of individuals, including high school or university students-uses  this "seed money" to
identify and design a program and to visit potential target villages or communities for consultation.
Second, once Japanese and local participants agree on a program in collaboration with local
NGOs and/or communities, they submit a formal grant request to the "Committee on Small-Scale ODA
Activity" for evaluation. If approved, the program is granted up to YI  0 million for implementation.
Only V  10  billion would cover one thousand such programs (the total ODA budget for FY 2001
exceeded V1.5  trillion, with Y920 billion for grants only). Yet, this scheme would have a large positive
impact on villages and communities worldwide, and render Japanese contributions more visible at local
levels. Moreover, Japanese citizens would have an active role in development and poverty reduction,
gaining awareness of international cooperation to the benefit of the whole Japanese society. To
implement such a scheme, the administration of ODA must become more flexible in delegating
decision making authority, and less restrictive in the use of funds for current expenditures or in the
requirement of local counterpart contributions.
21In regard to larger projects, Japan must attend to the impacts that its aid is having
on recipient countries-both  at the sector-wide and economy-wide levels-including
policy reforms induced by ODA. Moreover, Japan should strive for "voice" as well as
"visibility," and bring ideas based on its own historical experience to development
debates. In greater collaboration with international stakeholders such as the World Bank
and other MDBs, Japan will acquire valuable knowledge about the economic, political
and social conditions of low-income countries, as well as best practices.
In sum, Japan must respond to the challenges of the times by forming a national
ODA strategy. Such a scheme may require a new, unified aid agency or at least a cabinet-
level Strategic Council for Development Assistance, involving the MOFA, MOF, METI,
and other ministries. A national ODA strategy must involve: (1) clear objectives,
including the provision of international public goods such as sustainable development,
and with focus on poverty reduction and environmental improvement in low-income
countries; (2) total allocation of the national ODA budget toward these objectives; (3)
balance between bilateral and multilateral assistance, and distribution among types of aid
(i.e., grants, technical assistance, and loans) across recipient countries and across sectors
(both globally and within each country); (4) enhanced effectiveness, transparency and
accountability through a strengthened post-project evaluation system; (5) enhancement of
Japanese taxpayers' visibility and voice in aid activity; and (6) coordination with
international development partners.
Japan's fiscal woes-along  with the pressures of restructuring the FILP-may  well
be a blessing in disguise, the necessary catalyst for developing a new ODA strategy. By
following the above guidelines, and with the support of the international community,
Japan can implement better policies and institutions and shift from a "quantity" spender
to a "quality" partner in development.
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24Appendix Table: Net Official Flows to Developing Countries
(A) Official Development Assistance to Developing Countries (Million US dollars)
1990  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Japan  9,069  14,489  9,439  9,358  10,640  15,323
Bilateral  6,786  10,419  8,207  6,552  8,553  10,476
Grants (incl. TA)  3,014  6,298  5,438  4,985  4,901  5,475
Loans  3,772  4,120  2,769  1,568  3,652  5,001
Multilateral  2,282  4,071  1,232  2,806  2,087  4,848
United States  11,394  7,367  9,377  6,878  8,786  9,145
Bilateral  8,367  5,614  6,917  4,939  5,988  6,848
Grants (inl.  TA)  8,529  6,387  7,672  5,633  6,574  7,638
Loans  -162  -773  -755  -694  -585  -790
Multilateral  3,027  1,753  2,460  1,939  2,798  2,297
European Union  28,552  31,358  31,476  26,785  27,641  26,805
Bilateral  19,704  20,499  20,018  17,255  17,007  16,809
Grants (incl. TA)  16,364  19,361  19,417  16,915  17,316  17,060
Loans  3,339  1,138  600  380  -309  -250
Multilateral  8,848  10,859  11,459  9,490  10,634  9,996
(1) France  7,163  8,443  7,451  6,307  5,742  5,637
Bilateral  5,612  6,429  5,754  4,777  4,185  4,125
Grants (incl. TA)  3,714  5,890  5,634  4,906  4,540  4,320
Loans  1,898  538  120  -130  -355  -195
Multilateral  1,551  2,015  1,697  1,530  1,557  1,512
(2) Germany  6,320  7,524  7,601  5,857  5,581  5,515
Bilateral  4,479  4,815  4,535  3,639  3,491  3,278
Grants (incl. TA)  4,525  4,392  4,507  3,406  3,315  3,236
Loans  -46  423  29  233  176  42
Multilateral  1,841  2,709  3,066  2,218  2,090  2,238
(3) United Kingdom  2,638  3,202  3,199  3,433  3,864  3,401
Bilateral  1,474  1,716  1,790  1,979  2,132  2,249
Grants (incl. TA)  1,567  1,746  1,782  1,926  2,328  2,067
Loans  -92  -31  8  53  -196  182
Multilateral  1,164  1,487  1,409  1,454  1,732  1,153
(4) Netherlands  2,538  3,226  3,246  2,947  3,042  3,134
Bilateral  1,833  2,245  2,275  2,133  2,133  2,162
Grants (incl. TA)  1,707  2,545  2,509  2,302  2,323  2,359
Loans  126  -300  -234  -169  -190  -198
Multilateral  705  981  971  813  909  972
Total DAC Countries  54,490  58,927  55,622  48,497  52,084  56,378
Bilateral  38,688  40,628  39,119  32,429  35,204  37,862
Grants (mcl. TA)  32,282  36,184  36,534  31,282  32,465  33,910
Loans  6,405  4,444  2,585  1,147  2,739  3,951
Multilateral  15,802  18,299  16,503  16,068  16,880  18,517
Source:  OECD  DAC
25(B) Other  Official Flows to Developing Countries  (Million US dollars)
1990  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Japan  3,367  5,544  947  3,975  10,804  9,507
Bilateral  3,077  4,522  1,290  3,854  8,727  8,276
Multilateral  290  1,021  -343  121  2,076  1,231
United  States  -450  1,473  1,119  287  618  4,793
Bilateral  -450  1,473  1,119  287  618  4,793
Multilateral  0  0  0  0  0  0
European  Union  5,117  2,550  2,787  711  -8  -180
Bilateral  5,072  2,783  2,972  781  154  147
Multilateral  45  -234  -185  -70  -162  -327
(1) France  642  43  -284  94  -191  -3
Bilateral  642  43  -284  94  -191  -3
Multilateral  0  0  0  0  0  0
(2) Germany  2,110  879  194  -482  -321  -179
Bilateral  2,112  1,159  527  -193  -37  -43
Multilateral  -2  -280  -332  -288  -284  -136
(3) United Kingdom  628  213  81  -113  -54  -24
Bilateral  628  213  81  -113  -54  -24
Multilateral  0  0  0  0  0  0
(4) Netherlands  50  90  57  -193  253  -8
Bilateral  50  90  57  -193  253  -8
Multilateral  0  0  0  0  0  0
Total DAC Countries  8,631  9,872  5,562  6,125  13,491  15,477
Bilateral  8,388  9,084  6,089  6,074  11,483  14,528
Multilateral  242  788  -527  51  2,008  949
Source:  OECD DAC
26(C) Official Development Assistance and Other  Official Flows to Developing
Countries, Total (Million US dollars)
1990  1995  1996  1997  1998  1i999
Japan  12,436  20,033  10,386  13,315  21,444  24,830
Bilateral  9,863  14,941  9,497  10,406  17,280  18,752
Grants  (incl. TA)  3,014  6,298  5,438  4,985  4,901  5,475
ODA  Loans  3,772  4,120  2,769  1,568  3,652  5,001
Bilateral  OOF  3,077  4,522  1,290  3,854  8,727  8,276
Multilateral  2,572  5,092  889  2,927  4,163  6,079
United  States  10,944  8,840  10,496  7,165  9,404  13,938
Bilateral  7,917  7,087  8,036  5,226  6,606  11,641
Grants  (incl. TA)  8,529  6,387  7,672  5,633  6,574  7,638
ODA  Loans  -162  -773  -755  -694  -585  -790
Bilateral  OOF  -450  1,473  1,119  287  618  4,793
Multilateral  3,027  1,753  2,460  1,939  2,798  2,297
European  Union  33,669  33,908  34,263  27,496  27,634  26,625
Bilateral  24,775  23,283  22,989  18,076  17,161  16,956
Grants  (incl.  TA)  16,364  19,361  19,417  16,915  17,316  17,060
ODA  Loans  3,339  1,138  600  380  -309  -250
Bilateral  OOF  5,072  2,783  2,972  781  154  147
Multilateral  8,894  10,625  11,274  9,421  10,473  9,668
(1) France  7,806  8,486  7,168  6,401  5,551  5,634
Bilateral  6,254  6,472  5,471  4,871  3,994  4,122
Grants  (inel.  TA)  3,714  5,890  5,634  4,906  4,540  4,320
ODA  Loans  1,898  538  120  -130  -355  -195
Bilateral  OOF  642  43  -284  94  -191  -3
Multilateral  1,551  2,015  1,697  1,530  1,557  1,512
(2) Germany  8,430  8,403  7,795  5,375  5,260  5,336
Bilateral  6,591  5,974  5,062  3,446  3,454  3,235
Grants  (incl.  TA)  4,525  4,392  4,507  3,406  3,315  3,236
ODA  Loans  -46  423  29  233  176  42
Bilateral  OOF  2,112  1,159  527  -193  -37  -43
Multilateral  1,839  2,429  2,733  1,930  1,806  2,102
(3)  United  Kingdom  3,266  3,416  3,280  3,320  3,810  3,377
Bilateral  2,103  1,929  1,871  1,866  2,078  2,225
Grants  (incl.  TA)  1,567  1,746  1,782  1,926  2,328  2,067
ODA  Loans  -92  -31  8  53  -196  182
Bilateral  OOF  628  213  81  -113  -54  -24
Multilateral  1,164  1,487  1,409  1,454  1,732  1,153
(4) Netherlands  2,588  3,316  3,303  2,754  3,295  3,126
Bilateral  1,883  2,335  2,332  1,940  2,386  2,154
Grants  (incl. TA)  1,707  2,545  2,509  2,302  2,323  2,359
ODA  Loans  126  -300  -234  -169  -190  -198
Bilateral  OOF  50  90  57  -193  253  -8
Multilateral  705  981  971  813  909  972
Total  DAC Countries  63,120  68,798  61,183  54,622  65,575  71,855
Bilateral  47,076  49,712  45,208  38,503  46,687  52,390
Grants  (incl. TA)  32,282  36,184  36,534  31,282  32,465  33,910
ODA  Loans  6,405  4,444  2,585  1,147  2,739  3,951
Bilateral  OOF  8,388  9,084  6,089  6,074  11,483  14,528
Multilateral  16,044  19,087  15,976  16,119  18,888  19,466
Source:  OECD,  DAC.
27(D) Official  Aid  and Other Official Flows  to Part II Countries  (Million  US dollars)
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Japan  636  1,082  481  2,007  1,591
Official Aid  250  184  84  132  67
Other  Official Flows  386  898  397  1,874  1,524
United States  1,272  1,670  2,523  2,706  3,425
Official Aid  1,280  1,694  2,516  2,726  3,521
Other  Official  Flows  -8  -24  7  -20  -96
European  Union  12,591  2,056  1,219  9,976  596
Official Aid  6,295  1,028  609  4,988  298
Other  Official  Flows  6,295  1,028  609  4,988  298
(1) France  770  711  574  823  539
Official Aid  770  711  574  823  550
Other  Official Flows  0  0  0  0  -11
(2) Germany  8,639  2,237  1,125  5,139  997
Official Aid  4,514  1,329  660  654  729
Other Official Flows  4,124  908  465  4,485  268
(3) United  Kingdom  406  362  336  434  326
Official Aid  406  362  337  435  326
_Other  Official  Flows  0  0  -I  -I  0
(4) Netherlands  305  7  126  341  39
Official Aid  305  13  7  130  22
Other  Official Flows  0  -6  119  212  17
Total DAC Countries  15,920  7,470  6,260  12,954  9,214
Official Aid  9,202  5,696  5,331  6,040  6,193
Other  Official Flows  6,718  1,774  929  6,914  3,021
Source: OECD, DAC.
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